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Mark Gertler, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Anil Kashyap
Recent time-series work in macroeconomics has emphasized the role of the
interest rate spread between risky and safe debt in forecasting real GNP. Stock
and Watson (1989) and Friedman and Kuttner (1989) demonstrate that this
interest differential has greater predictive power for output than money, inter-
est rates, or any other financial variable. Increases in the spread are associated
with subsequent downturns in GNP growth. While this analysis is limited to
postwar data, similar results apply to the prewar period.'
Though the statistical relation between the spread and output appears ro-
bust, relatively little effort has been devoted to providing a sound structural
interpretation of the evidence. It is clear that, under any story, movements in
the spread reflect changes in "payoff" or "default" risk, broadly defined.
2
Nonetheless, the question emerges as to what are the sources of shifts in this
payoff risk. In this paper, we argue that the countercyclical pattern in the
spread may in part be symptomatic of a financial element in the business-cycle
propagation mechanism. Our reasoning draws heavily on some recent theoret-
ical work that links informational problems in capital markets at the micro
level with fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. We also provide some
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supporting econometric evidence, extending methods used recently to test for
the impact of credit-market imperfections on investment.
The theoretical literature to which we allude motivates a financial propaga-
tion mechanism by providing a rationale for why the agency costs of external
finance may fluctuate countercyclically. Countercyclical movements in the
wedge between external and internal finance, in turn, introduce a kind of "ac-
celerator" effect on investment, ultimately magnifying investment and output
fluctuations.
3 As Calomiris and Hubbard (1990) note, an associated implica-
tion of these theories is that the spread between risky and safe interest rates
should move inversely with investment and output. The basic idea is that the
widening of the spread is associated with, among other things, increased
agency costs of external finance. In addition to being compatible with the
time-series evidence, these theories also provide some formal underpinnings
for the earlier work on financial crisis, which emphasized sharp increases in
the spread as the precursors to financially induced disruptions in real activity.
An alternative to our story is that cyclical shifts in payoff risk are indepen-
dent of financial factors. Defaults, for example, may be driven purely by tech-
nological factors. The spread is then useful as a "leading indicator" simply
because it contains information about future technological disturbances, and
not because there is any meaningful respect in which financial structure inter-
acts with real activity. Indeed, this is a popular interpretation of the Stock-
Watson results. While this explanation has some intuitive appeal, the under-
lying theory is incomplete. In the absence of any kind of imperfection in
capital markets, the pattern of financial payoffs from borrowers to lenders is
indeterminate (since the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies). In particular,
since leverage ratios are indeterminate, there need be no particular connection
between interest rate spreads and output fluctuations, as we demonstrate later.
In any event, a test of the competing theories is available. If the spread is
simply an "information" variable and does not in any way reflect credit-
market imperfections, then the data should not cause one to reject the neoclas-
sical model of investment under perfect capital markets. If the story we offer
is true—that is, movements in the spread reflect, at least in part, underlying
movements in agency costs of external finance—then the null model should
not hold. Further, an alternative model which relates firms' marginal cost of
finance to agency factors should fit the data, where the movements in the
interest rate spread can serve as a proxy for unobserved movements in agency
costs.
We proceed in two steps. In section 1.1, we develop a simple model of
investment and financial contracting under asymmetric information in which
the link between interest differentials and the agency costs of external finance
is made precise, and in which changes in the (endogenous) interest rate spread
predict future movements in investment and output. We produce an example
within the context of the Euler equation corresponding to firms' intertemporal
decisions about investment. Situations are identified where, due to agency13 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
problems, the basic Euler equation for investment is violated. Shifts in inter-
est rate differentials help predict investment in these periods. By necessity, the
theoretical model is highly stylized and, therefore, cannot be matched directly
to data. However, we estimate a model that loosely incorporates the key fea-
tures of the simple stylized model. The estimation results are presented in
section 1.2. Section 1.3 concludes.
1.1 Interest Differentials and Fluctuations Under Asymmetric
Information
To illustrate how the empirical link between the spread and output fluctua-
tions may, at least in part, reflect a financial mechanism, we present a simple
model of investment finance under asymmetric information. We demonstrate
first that in the benchmark case of symmetric information, there is no partic-
ular connection between financial variables (including the spread) and real
variables; that is, the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies. A standard Euler
equation for investment emerges. Under asymmetric information, however, a
determinate pattern emerges. Firms' financial positions become relevant to the
investment decision; investment moves inversely with firms' internal net
worth. One manifestation of this relation is that changes in the spread help
predict investment, even after controlling for changes in investment opportu-
nities. In particular, an additional term emerges in the Euler equation, reflect-
ing the impact of credit-market imperfections; this term covaries with the in-
terest rate spread.
The model is a variant of Gertler and Hubbard (1988) and Gertler and Ro-
goff (1990). There are two periods, zero and one. In period zero, an entrepre-
neur (i.e., the firm) has access to a production technology which yields a
random quantity of output in period one, taking capital as input. Investment /
is done in period zero and entails convex adjustment costs A(I), where A(-) is
twice continuously differentiate with A(0) = 0, A' > OandA" > 0. Capital
K available for use as input in period one is given by
(1) K = I + (1 - S)tf0,
where 8 is the depreciation rate and Ko is the period zero capital stock, which
we take as given.
The mean level of output increases at a diminishing rate in the level of
capital used as input. In particular, output y obeys the following two-point
distribution:
4
_ \Y with probability P(K)
{ '
 y [0 with probability 1 - P(K)
where P(K) is increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differenti-
able, with P(0) = 0 and P(°°) = 1. That is, more capital raises the probabil-
ity of obtaining a high level of output, and the marginal gain is diminishing.14 M. Gertler/R. G. Hubbard/A. Kashyap
The entrepreneur/firm has initial resources Wo ("internal net worth"). We
interpret Wo broadly here to include current cash, known collateralizable fu-
ture resources, or valued relationships with lenders specializing in informa-
tion gathering and monitoring (such as commercial banks). To invest more
than Wo, the balance B must be borrowed using risky (noncollateralized) ex-
ternal finance.
5 To do so, the firm issues a state-contingent security which
pays lenders L
g in the event of a good outcome and L
b in the event of a bad
outcome. Given that/? is the alternative gross riskless return available to lend-
ers, and given that lenders are risk-neutral, the payments on the security must
satisfy




The pattern of payments offered by the security must also satisfy the following
feasibility conditions, corresponding to limited liability (given that Wo is al-
ready invested):
(5) U <Y, L
b< 0.
The firm maximizes expected terminal wealth E{WX). Given that the entrepre-
neur may invest in his project or lend at the market rate R, E(WX) is given by
(6) E{WX) = P(K)Y - [P(K)U + (1 - P(K))L
b]
+ R(W0 + B -I)- A(I).
The first two terms in equation (6) are expected net project earnings; the third
is the return from holding the safe asset; and the fourth is the adjustment cost
of investing.
The outcome under symmetric information is simple to characterize. The
firm invests in productive capital to the point at which expected marginal prof-
itability of investment equals the gross riskless return plus the marginal cost
of investing. That is, the first-best value of investment /* is given by
(7) P'(K*)Y = R + A'(I*),
where K* =/* + (1 — §)K0. Equation (7) is a conventional Euler equation
for capital accumulation.
It is also important to note that the pattern of contractual payments is inde-
terminate in this case. Any set of payoffs which satisfies the expected-return
constraint (6) is acceptable. Because information is symmetric, there is no
interdependence between financial structure and real economic decisions. As
a consequence, there is no relation between the spread and investment in this
case, after controlling for the variables that appear in equation (7).
To motivate a meaningful role for financial structure, we introduce a classic
incentive problem, one described originally by Berle and Means (1932) as the
basic motive for divergence of interests between ownership and management.
6
In particular, we assume lenders cannot observe the disposition of investment15 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
funds. That is, while outside lenders observe firms' initial resources Wo and
total borrowing B, the borrower has private information about how he allo-
cates investment funds. For simplicity, we assume he can divert the funds to
the safe asset and reap the benefits from this activity himself.
On the other hand, outside lenders may observe output. Under asymmetric
information, therefore, contracts can be conditioned only on realized output y
and not on investment /. Given the output-contingent payoffs {L
g,L
b) specified
by the contract, the borrower will choose / to maximize expected final wealth,
given by equation (6). This involves equating his expected marginal gain from
investing with the opportunity cost of secretly diverting funds to a safe asset:
(8) P'(K)[Y - (L
g - L
b)] = R + A'(I).
So long as L
g differs from L
b, investment / will differ from its first-best opti-
mum value /*, as may be seen by comparing (7) and (8). The problem is that
the borrower's marginal gain from investing depends not only on the marginal
gain in expected output but on the change in his expected obligation to lenders
as well. In designing the contract, lenders take into account the borrower's
decision rule, as given by (8).
Note that the larger is the spread between L
g and L
b, the larger is the gap
between / and the first-best level, /*. One way to obtain the first best would
be to make L
b large enough that the contract would be truly "sum certain," so
that U = U = R (I* - Wo). This optimum is not feasible when Wo < /*,
because of the limited liability condition in equation (5) (recall that the project
yields nothing in the bad state).
Consider the case for which borrowing is required (Wo < /*). The solution
to the contracting problem is fairly intuitive. The contract pays lenders noth-
ing in the bad state, so that the limited liability condition (5) is binding for L
b.
(More generally, the contract always pays lenders the maximum feasible
amount in the bad state.) This arrangement minimizes the spread between L
g
and L
b, thereby minimizing the gap between /* and /. Similarly, equation (4)
is binding; under the incentive-compatible arrangement, the firm borrows
only to finance investment and does not allocate funds to the riskless asset.





b = 0 and B = / — Wo, the following two relations jointly
determine / and L
g:
(9) YP'(K) = R + A' (/) + UP'(K)
(10) U = R(I - W0)/P(K),
where K = / + (1 - h)KQ from equation (1).
Equation (9) is obtained from the incentive condition (8) and is a
downward-sloping locus in (I,L
g) space. The curve slopes downward since
higher values of L
g lower the firm's expected marginal gain from investment
and therefore must be offset by reduced investment. Equation (10) is obtained16 M. Gertler/R. G. Hubbard/A. Kashyap
from the condition that the security must offer a competitive return (from eq.
[3]) and is upward sloping in (I,L
g). The positive relation emerges because
higher investment requires greater borrowing and because L
b cannot adjust,
since the limited liability constraint is binding.
Whenever Wo < /*, investment / will be less than the first-best level, /*.
Increases in internal net worth raise investment by lowering L
g, thereby relax-
ing the impact of the incentive constraint on investment.
The spread S between the firm's marginal cost of finance and the riskless
rate is given by
S~B~
R
When the incentive constraint is binding, the spread is always positive. Fur-
ther, a rise in Wo increases K, and therefore reduces 5. That is, BK/dW0 > 0,
implying 8S/dW0 < 0.
If the only shocks in the economy were to firms' net worth (Wo), then there
will be an inverse relation between changes in the spread (AS) and the level of
investment (A/if = /). In this case, movements in the spread contain infor-
mation about movements in net worth.
7 Of course, in actual data, this relation
is a correlation. Shocks to the level or distribution of the marginal product of
capital will also shift the spread (given some level of net worth). To carry the
simple Euler equation in (8) to data, it will be necessary in the estimation
procedure to control for such shifts, as we describe in section 1.2.2 below.
It is worth emphasizing that shocks to internal net worth Wo can be broadly
interpreted here—for example, reductions in collateralizable resources (Ger-
tler and Hubbard 1988), increases in debt-service burdens (Calomiris, Hub-
bard, and Stock 1986; Gertler and Hubbard 1991), or disruptions in ("bank")
credit markets in which problems of asymmetric information are less severe
(Bernanke 1983; Calomiris and Hubbard 1989). In each case the transmission
mechanism is that movements in the "spread" correspond to shocks to internal
net worth, owing to the impact of movements in net worth on the agency costs
of external finance.
1.2 Empirical Evidence of U.S. GNP Growth and Investment
1.2.1 Interest Rate Spreads, GNP growth, and Investment:
Reduced-Form Evidence
For our empirical work, we examine short-term spreads. One reason for
preferring short-term measures to the alternative long-term Baa-Treasury17 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
bond spread is that the Baa-Treasury spread data are not stationary over our
period (with a significant increase in the average value of the spread during
the 1980s, relative to the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s). We focus on the short-
term interest rate differential corresponding to the spread between six-month
commercial paper and Treasury bill rates. The spread is plotted in figure 1.1.
The short-term spread is positive in all periods, of course, averaging 61 basis
points. Following the intuition noted in the previous section, we will focus
our attention on changes in the spread, which can be pronounced (as in 1970,
1974, and 1982, for example).
We begin our empirical analysis by corroborating the predictive power of
the interest rate spread for output growth (measured by the growth rate of real
GNP). As a simple reduced-form test, we regressed the quarterly GNP growth
rate on a constant, on four lags of the GNP growth rate, and on four lagged
values of the spread or changes in the spread. Given lags and consideration of
the thickness of the market, the quarterly data cover the period from 1964 to
1989. We can reject at the 1.9 x 10 ~
6 level the hypothesis that the spread
coefficients are zero; approximately the same level of rejection holds for the
change in the interest rate spread. The coefficient estimates suggest a negative
effect of the spread on GNP growth.
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Fig. 1.2 Investment rate and the short-term interest rate differential
examining the effects of movements in the spread on investment. Data on real
gross private domestic investment in fixed, nonresidential producers' durable
equipment are plotted in figure 1.2. We selected equipment investment be-
cause of the greater variation in the series (relative to structures investment)
during our sample period, and because of the negative trend in the investment-
to-capital ratio for structures over the period. Repeating the simple time-series
tests done for GNP growth for investment, we can reject at the 0.0014 level
the hypothesis that the spread coefficients are zero (or at the 0.10 level for the
change in the spread). As with GNP growth, there is a negative effect of the
spread on the rate of investment. These results are consistent with the findings
in Stock and Watson (1989) of the predictive power of the interest rate differ-
ential for real activity. To investigate these correlations more formally, we
outline below an econometric approach to modeling investment in the spirit of
the model of section 1.1.
1.2.2 Econometric Approach for Investment
There are serious difficulties in econometric implementation of investment
models, even without considerations of capital market imperfections. One
conventional approach stresses the role of "marginal q" the increase in firm19 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
value from additions to the capital stock. It is well known that by specifying a
functional form for adjustment costs, one can solve for an investment function
relating the rate of investment to q (see, for example, Hayashi 1982 and Sum-
mers 1981). The problems with this approach are three. First, its empirical
success in explaining the variation in investment (in aggregate data or micro
data) has not been overwhelming. Second, empirical proxies for "marginal
q"—typically "average q"—are likely to be inadequate, owing to imperfect
competition in the product market, non-constant returns to scale in produc-
tion, or imperfect capital markets. Finally, the q model may be an inappro-
priate vehicle given our interest in asymmetric information, as expectations
reflected in prices quoted on centralized securities markets will not in general
reflect insiders' valuations of future investment projects.
8
Our stylized model of section 1.1 suggests an Euler equation for investment
with adjustment costs, modified to include a term that reflects credit-market
imperfections (see eq. [8]). Since this model is not directly estimable, we
follow the approach outlined in Hubbard and Kashyap (1990) to examine the
effects on investment of proxies for movements in internal net worth. Specifi-
cally, we develop an empirical Euler equation for investment that incorporates
the possibility that financial constraints are important. As in section 1.1, vio-
lations of a null ("perfect capital markets") Euler equation should be in the
direction of an alternative model in which variations in net worth affect the
marginal cost of outside finance, holding constant investment opportunities.
We argue, expanding upon the model in section 1.1, that movements in the
interest rate differential are good proxies for these shifts in net worth. This
approach builds upon the related approach of Zeldes (1988) in testing for li-
quidity constraints on consumption.
While the discussion in section 1.1 applies to "investment" broadly, we
present evidence below for effects of interest differentials (as proxies for inter-
nal net worth) on fixed investment using annual time-series data for pro-
ducers' durable equipment investment in the United States. The specific
framework within which we operate is derived under the assumption that risk-
neutral firms maximize the present discounted value (V) of profits (II) from
investment, where
(12)
where (3, is the discount factor at time t. The maximization takes place subject
to the following constraints:
1. Capital Accumulation: Kt = (1 - $)#,_, + /,, where / and K represent
investment and the end-of-period capital stock, respectively, and where 8 is
the (assumed constant) rate of depreciation.
2. Profits: Profits are the residual after taxes, payments to variable factors,20 M. Gertler/R. G. Hubbard/A. Kashyap
investment (and adjustment costs), and debt service. Finance is composed of
internal equity and debt.
9
Let:
N = vector of variable factors of production;
w = vector of variable factor prices;
B = value of net debt outstanding (one-period loans);
/ = interest rate on loans;
p' = effective price of capital goods at time t (incorporating tax
considerations);
F(Kt_x,Nt) = revenue function (F'K > 0, F"K < 0); and A{Kt_,,/,) = costs of adjusting the capital stock.
Then,
II, = F(K,_ltN,) - W,N, - A(I,,K,_X)
~ i,-A-, + B, -B,_x - p>It.
All prices and values are expressed relative to the general output price deflator
(i.e., so that real profits are maximized).
3. Transversality Condition: So that firms cannot borrow an infinite amount
to distribute, we require that
T-\
lim X PA = 0, V,.
r->oc t=o
The recent tradition in the <?-theory literature is to assume that marginal and
average q are equal, and to obtain an estimating equation. Instead of following
this route, we choose to eliminate the shadow value of capital from the first-
order condition for the choice of the capital stock, and work with the dynamic
equation for investment, as in Hubbard and Kashyap (1990). That is, the first-
order condition for the choice of the capital stock (from maximizing [12],
subject to the constraints mentioned above) is given by
(14) V,+ iE,{FK, ~ AK(K,Jt+1) + (1 - 8) [A,(KJt+x) + p't+x]}
-A,(K,_M -P', = 0-
To obtain an equation for investment, it is necessary to parameterize the
adjustment cost function A. We let
1
0
(15) A(Kt_x,It) = [cto((/, / K,_x) - p.) + (a, I 2)((/, / K,_x) - ^)
2]Kt_v
where (x is the average (normal) investment rate. Now,
(16) AIt = ao + «,(/,/*,_, - MO,
and
(17) AK, = -(a, / 2)(/,+ 1 / K,)
2 - n(a0 - a.jt / 2).21 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
Substituting (16) and (17) into (14) yields the Euler equation:
&+.£/*, + P,+ i£,{(<*i / 2)(/,+ 1 / KY + M- K - alM. / 2)}
(18) - a0 - «,(/,/*,_, - \L)-p\
+ pf+1 (1 - 8)£,{a0 + a, (/f+1 / tf, - »i) + P;+I} = 0.
We assume that expectations are rational and allow for an expectational
error r\, where Et (r\l+,) = 0 and Et (-n
2+ ,) = CT
2 . Hence we obtain:
P,+ 1£/K, + &+,£,{(<*, / 2)(/f+1 / /Q
2 + p. (Oo - alM, / 2)}
(19) - a0 - <*,(/,//:,_, - ji) - pj
+ Pf+I (1 - 8) £,{a0 + a, (/,+ 1 / K, - p.) + tf+I} = T,,+ 1.
The model in (19) is a nonlinear equation in UK and can be estimated to iden-
tify a,.
We incorporate financial factors by adding a constraint on the use of debt
finance by firms. In particular, we assume that the outstanding debt B must be
less than a debt ceiling B*. The ceiling, while possibly unobservable to the
econometrician, depends on measures of collateralizable net worth. That is,
movements in the value of firms' net worth will affect firms' ability to finance
investment, holding constant actual investment opportunities.
1
1 If we let co be
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that B ^ B*, the first
order condition for borrowing (from the maximization of [12]) is now
(20) 1 - p,+ 1(l + it) - co, = 0,
so that when co is nonzero, p,+ 1 = (1 — to,)/(l + it). We can now rewrite
equation (19) as:
{ao[(3,+ 1(l - 8) (1 - <or) - 1 + |x] + alM.[(l - |x) / 2]}
+ P,+ 1[^, + («, / 2)(/,+ 1 / KtY + 01,(1 - 8) (/,+ 1 / Kt) (21) + (1 - h)p't+l] - ax(ltIKt_x) - p\
During periods in which the constraint is binding, co > 0, and the error term
contains the additional expression in (21).
Two issues arise in the estimation of (21). First, there is an obvious si-
multaneity problem because of the presence of other endogenous variables
along with UK. This necessitates the use of instrumental variables. The exact
set of instruments used is discussed below. Second, comparison of equations
(19) and (21) reveals the significance of financial constraints for the model to
be estimated. When co is zero, the standard "perfect capital markets" model is
a good approximation. When co > 0, however, financial constraints affect in-
vestment spending. Ideally, we would like to have data on "internal net worth"
to specify a relationship between co and observable variables. We argued in22 M. Gertler/R. G. Hubbard/A. Kashyap
the section 1.1 that changes in the interest rate spreads can serve as proxies
for unobserved effects of net worth on investment. Hence, following equation
(11), we let
(22) co, = 7l + 72AS,_P
where 5 represents the interest rate spread. Again, in the empirical results
reported below, we employ as a proxy the difference between yields on six-
month commercial paper and Treasury bills.
Our approach follows the intuition from the previous section. We first esti-
mate the null model corresponding to equation (19) over our sample period.
Second, we estimate the alternative model corresponding to (21), with the




The data used in estimating the Euler equations for equipment investment
are standard macroeconomic time-series that are available from several
sources. From the terms in equation (19), the discount factor p is constructed
using one of two proxies for the ex ante real rate of interest. First, we define
the real rate as the difference between the average market yield on U.S. Trea-
sury securities at a one-year constant maturity and the average expectation of
the one-year-ahead change in the consumer price index. Expectations data are
taken from the survey on inflation expectations conducted by the Survey Re-
search Center of the University of Michigan.
1
3 Second, as a risky interest rate
alternative, we use the Moody's Baa Bond rate minus the expected inflation
proxy suggested in Gordon and Veitch (1986).
We use a series on the average product of capital to proxy for the marginal
product of capital. The two variables will be proportional when the technol-
ogy is constant returns to scale and factors are paid competitively. While the
assumption that the ratio of price to marginal cost is unity is questionable, the
alternative approach of using separate data for output and cost and estimating
a markup is even more difficult at this level of aggregation. The difficulty
arises primarily because, when using the National Income and Product Ac-
counts, it is not possible to separate completely the returns to different fac-
tors.
1
4 Thus, we use the sum of pre-tax corporate profits (with capital con-
sumption and inventory valuation adjustment) and net interest as the return to
capital. In particular, the ratio of this sum to the beginning-of-period capital
stock is our average product-of-capital measure.
As noted earlier, our investment data pertain to real gross private domestic
investment in fixed, nonresidential producers' durable equipment. The corre-
sponding capital-stock series is constructed by a perpetual inventory calcula-
tion starting in 1950 using an assumed (annual) rate of depreciation of 0.137
(the estimated rate obtained by Auerbach and Hines 1987). The initial value
of the series for the capital stock is taken from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.23 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
The price variable appearing in equation (19) is the tax-corrected price of
investment goods (relative to the output price). The price deflators used in
constructing this ratio are the implicit price deflator for gross private domestic
investment in fixed, nonresidential producers' durable equipment and the im-
plicit GNP deflator.
1.2.4 Evidence for Investment
Before outlining the results, we should stress two features of our estimation
procedures. First, since we use interest rate data (nominal interest rates and
measures of expected inflation) in constructing the discount factor (3, shifts in
interest rates are already accounted for, and cannot explain a correlation be-
tween the change in the interest rate spread and the investment residuals from
equation (19). Second, we estimate using an instrumental variables procedure
and exclude the current observed change in the spread from the instrument
list. This is important, since using contemporaneous data on the change in the
spread would not allow us to distinguish our hypothesis from a competing
model in which contemporaneous movements in the spread reflect contempo-
raneous technology shocks not accounted for in our approach.
We present our results from estimating the structural model for investment
in tables 1.1 and 1.2. The data are quarterly, covering the period from 1964
through 1989. First, we estimate the null model in equation (19) for produc-
ers' durable equipment. Second, we estimate the alternative model incorpo-
rating (21); that is, we allow the multiplier on the credit constraint to depend
on a constant and lagged change in the spread.
Results from estimating (19) and (21) by generalized methods of move-
ments are presented in table 1.1. Instruments for the endogenous variables
include a constant and four lagged values of each of the following: UK, (UK)
2,
the ratio of profits to capital, the commercial paper-Treasury bill interest rate
spread, and the change in the log of the S&P 500 stock index, as well as a
single lag of the discount factor and the current and lagged values of the tax-
adjusted relative price of equipment investment goods. The two columns
shown for each model correspond to the two ex ante real rate proxies used in
constructing (3—the "riskless" and "risky" alternatives, respectively. Over-
identifying restrictions associated with the null model are soundly rejected at
the 2 percent and 7 percent levels, respectively.
As noted in the second set of columns in table 1.1, the alternative model—
in which the change in the interest rate spread affects the value of the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the financial constraint—can be rejected only at the
10 or 11 percent level. The adjustment cost coefficient remains precisely esti-
mated, and the estimate of the (transformed) share of equipment capital does
not change much.
1
5 The coefficient on the (lagged) change in the interest rate
spread, which measures the marginal impact on the Lagrange multiplier, is
positive and precisely estimated. Taken literally, the implied effect is very
large; a 10-basis-point increase in the spread would be equivalent to lowering24 M. Gertler/R. G. Hubbard/A. Kashyap
Table 1.1 Euler Equation Estimates for U.S. Equipment Investment (1964-89),
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Note: The models are estimated using generalized method of moments. For the "null" and "alter-
native" models, the two columns refer to measures of (3 constructed from one-year Treasury and
Baa bond rates, respectively. Instrumental variables include a constant and four lagged values
each of UK, {UK)
1, the ratio of profits to capital, the commercial paper-Treasury bill interest rate
spread, and the change in the log of the S&P 500 stock index, as well as a single lag of the
discount factor and the current and lagged values of the tax-adjusted relative price of equipment
investment goods. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
the (quarterly) discount factor (3 from an average of about 0.99 to about 0.94,
significantly increasing the (implied annual) discount rate. Given that infor-
mation about future payoff risk is already in the level of the interest rate, such
a shift is difficult to explain without information-related capital-market fric-
tions.
We considered the possibility, however, that potential misspecification of
the underlying null model could lead to a spurious correlation between the
residuals (from [19]) and any forward-looking variable. To explore this case,
we tried two other "leading indicator" variables suggested by Stock and Wat-
son (1989), the percentage changes in "housing starts" and "manufacturers'
unfilled orders" instead of the change in the spread. Those results are reported
in table 1.2 using the "risky" discount factor; results using the risk-free rate in
constructing (3 were virtually identical.
The first column for each variable represents results from estimating the
null model in equation (19), adding the leading indicator variable to the in-
strument list. In both cases, the overidentifying restrictions associated with
the model are rejected by the data; the coefficient estimates resemble closely
those reported for similar cases in table 1.1. Allowing a separate effect of the
lagged percentage change in housing starts or manufacturers' unfilled orders25 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
does not change this result. Rejection levels actually increase, and the signs
on the coefficients on both variables are counterintuitive from the perspective
of an omitted-leading-indicators explanation, although these coefficients are
imprecisely estimated.
Finally, we add both the (lagged) change in the interest rate spread and the
percentage change in the alternative "leading indicator" variables. Those re-
sults are reported in table 1.3 (using the risky rate alternative in constructing
(3). In both cases, the coefficient on the change in the spread is positive, pre-
cisely estimated, and approximately the same size as the estimate in table 1.1.
The coefficients on either of the alternative leading indicator measures (hous-
ing starts and manufacturers' unfilled orders) are of the wrong sign and are
very imprecisely estimated. The factors leading to the acceptance of the over-
identifying restrictions for the alternative model are associated only with the
interest rate spread variable and not with alternative "leading indicator" mea-
sures.
Table 1.2 Euler Equation Estimates for U.S. Equipment Investment (1964-89),
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Note: The models are estimated using generalized method of moments. In all cases, (3 is con-
structed from the Baa bond rate and our measure of expected inflation. Instrumental variables
include a constant and four lagged values each of UK, (llK)
2, the ratio of profits to capital, the
percentage change in the "leading indicator" variable, and the change in the log of the S&P 500
stock index, as well as a single lag of the discount factor and the current and lagged values of the
tax-adjusted relative price of equipment investment goods. The two leading indicator variables
are denoted by "H" (housing starts) and "UO" (manufacturers' unfilled orders). Heteroscedastic-
ity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.26 M. Gertler/R. G. Hubbard/A. Kashyap
Table 1.3 Euler Equation Estimates for U.S. Equipment Investment (1964-89),
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Note: The models are estimated using generalized method of moments. In both cases, p is con-
structed from the Baa bond rate and our measure of expected inflation. Instrumental variables
include a constant and four lagged values each of UK, (lIK)
2, the ratio of profits to capital, the
percentage change in the "leading indicator" variable, and the change in the log of the S&P 500
stock index, as well as a single lag of the discount factor and the current and lagged values of the
tax-adjusted relative price of equipment investment goods. The two leading indicator variables
are denoted by "H" (housing starts) and "UO" (manufacturers' unfilled orders). Heteroscedastic-
ity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
1.3 Conclusion and Implications
In this paper, we have presented a simple framework that incorporates a
role for "interest spreads" in models of investment fluctuations. Our empirical
work suggests that links between changes in interest rate spreads and invest-
ment are consistent with models emphasizing (i) how movements in agency
costs of external finance can amplify investment fluctuations and, relatedly,
(ii) how changes in the interest spread may signal movements in these agency
costs. Because we worked with aggregate time-series data, the usual caveats
apply. The results suggest, however, that fluctuations in agency costs (induced
in large part by changes in firms' net worth) significantly affect the timing of
investment. In addition, the findings shed light on the significance of widen-27 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
ing interest rate spreads for predicting output declines in postwar time-series
(Stock and Watson 1989), as well as during earlier periods of financial crises
(Bernanke 1983; Calomiris and Hubbard 1989).
That the predictive power of short-term interest differentials likely reflects
more than simple technological risk has also been argued recently by Ber-
nanke (1990). Bernanke finds further that the commercial paper-Treasury bill
spread measures the stance of monetary policy; specifically, he notes that the
spread is related to traditional indicators of monetary policy (e.g., the Federal
funds rate). An explanation, consistent with our analysis, is that contraction-
ary monetary policy shrinks commercial bank lending, forcing marginal
(high-agency-cost) firms to raise funds through the commercial paper market
(e.g., see Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 1991). As well, in part, an increase in
the riskless rate of interest (resulting from a tightening of monetary policy)
lowers the value of firms' collateralizable net worth, increasing agency costs
of external finance. That is, the effect on investment and output of a change in
the riskless rate associated with contractionary monetary policy is magnified
through the information-related channel we have stressed. While more careful
research on these transmission mechanisms is needed, we believe that our
approach and that taken by Bernanke are complementary.
A logical extension of our approach would be to study panel data and ex-
ploit predictions about cross-sectional differences in firm behavior. For ex-
ample, as Calomiris and Hubbard (1990) note, the "perfect markets" neoclas-
sical model of investment should work for firms unlikely to face financial
constraints. Movements in the interest spread should be relevant to the invest-
ment behavior of those firms likely to be constrained. Presuming it is possible
to divide the sample appropriately, it would be interesting to investigate this




1. The associations with financial crisis of widening interest rate differentials
among securities of different quality was stressed early on by Sprague (1910), who
studied financial panics during the National Banking Period in the United States. Dur-
ing panic episodes, rates changed to risky borrowers rose dramatically relative to rates
on safe securities. Historical accounts generally link financial crises to subsequent fluc-
tuations (see, e.g., Bagehot 1873; Sprague 1910; and Mitchell 1913), though the pre-
cise channels are not always clear. Mishkin (in this volume) has documented the
historical association of a widening differential between risky and safe rates and sub-
sequent recessions.
Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) use models based on links between interest differen-
tials and subsequent output fluctuations under asymmetric information in the period
just prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve system. They construct a set of instru-
ments to approximate the difference between the low-risk cost of capital under sym-
metric information and the actual cost of borrowed funds. Using a structural VAR28 M. Gertler/R. G. Hubbard/A. Kashyap
model, they find that shocks to risk differentials had a positive effect on business fail-
ures and negative effects on bank loans and output. This focus on interest differentials
parallels the seminal study by Bernanke (1983) of financial factors in the propagation
mechanism of the economic downturn of the early 1930s. Focusing on the breakdown
of the banking system, Bernanke notes that the pool of borrowers in loan markets
(some of which would have been serviced by banks) was of lower quality in the 1930s,
raising the differential between risky and safe interest rates. The differential between
Baa corporate bond yields and the yields on U.S. government bonds was a strong
explainer of current and future output growth.
2. A possible exception to this argument is that taxes and regulatory frictions may
lead to shifts in safe rates and thereby widen the spread (for a discussion, see Cook and
Lawler 1983).
3. See, for example, Keeton (1979), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Greenwald, Stig-
litz, and Weiss (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), Williamson (1987), Bernanke and
Gertler (1990), Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), and the survey in Gertler (1988).
Countercyclical movements in agency costs may be explained by procyclical move-
ments in borrowers' net worth. See Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991b) for evi-
dence on the real costs (in terms of reduced investment and sales) of financial distress.
4. The use of zero in the bad-state outcome and the two-state description of the
production realization are not crucial for the qualitative results that follow.
5. Strictly speaking, we are treating Wo as "internal funds," so that / — M^o is the
amount borrowed. The real equilibrium is unaffected if Wo is instead "collateralizable
resources."
6. See also Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), and Gertler and Hubbard
(1991).
7. Strictly speaking, in the example we present, the capital stock K contains as
much information about internal net worth as does S (see eq. [9]). This is only because
we have treated Wo as "internal funds" to minimize algebra. If Wo instead represented
"collateralizable resources," S would reflect some information about Wo not contained
in AT.
8. In micro-data studies in this area, "q" has been used as a reduced-form control
for investment opportunities, so that some included measure of inside finance (argua-
bly) does not substitute for expected future profits (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
1988; and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991a).
9. We do not mean to suggest that equity finance is irrelevant at the margin in actual
data. However, the inclusion of equity finance adds little to the basic setup for testing
the effects of internal net worth on investment spending.
10. This formulation assumes convex adjustment costs. In addition, those costs are
decreasing in the size of the capital stock.
11. This specification of a "finance constraint" is not particularly restrictive. If
firms faced an upward-sloping debt-supply schedule, so that /, = i(Bt_{ — B*), where
i" >0,thenP,+ 1 = (1 -i',)l{\ +!,).
12. Here we are building on recent Euler equation tests of effects of financial con-
straints on investment (see, e.g., Hubbard and Kashyap 1990; Whited 1990; Gilchrist
1989; and Himmelberg 1989). For an earlier treatment, see Bernstein and Nadiri
(1986).
13. Using the (one-year-ahead) ex ante real rate calculated by Huizinga and Mish-
kin (1986) produced qualitatively similar results.
14. For example, proprietors' income relative to capital has declined markedly over
the last forty years. If one excludes proprietors' income from variable costs, then the
difference between output and cost (relative to capital) likewise has a downward trend.29 Interest Rate Spreads and Investment Fluctuations
Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify the portion of proprietors' income that
represents labor input. Therefore, it is not possible to make a simple adjustment to
produce a reliable series on variable costs.
15. The estimate is that of the share of equipment capital in total capital.
16. Work by Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1991) directly pursues this approach.
Other recent empirical studies have emphasized shifts in the distribution of net worth
across firms (see Bernanke and Campbell 1988; Bernanke, Campbell, and Whited
1990; and Warshawsky, in this volume).
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